

LOCAL GOVERNMENT SUPPORT AND LEARNING NETWORK (LOGOSUL)  
Department of Local Government and Housing, Northern Cape

*Project:*

**LINKING IDP's TO MUNICIPAL BUDGETS**

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**Municipal Commonage Management**

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## 1. Introduction

The National Department of Agriculture and Land Affairs has set the target of redistributing 30% of the land to black aspirant farmers by 2015. There is much uncertainty as to whether this target is tenable, especially in light of the limited land that is available for redistribution.<sup>1</sup> Nevertheless, there is widespread acknowledgement that meaningful land redistribution is a political imperative and that the current redistribution process needs to be accelerated.

The pressure on the Department of Land Affairs (DLA) to increase the rate of the redistribution programme has led to renewed scrutiny of the large tracts of commonage currently owned by municipalities in the Northern Cape. There have been growing calls for this land to be used to further land reform efforts and assist Local Governments to fulfil the “developmental” responsibilities outlined for them in the Municipal Systems Act (2000).

That this is not taking place is arguably a lost opportunity that South Africa might live to rue. Much of the rest of this paper explores barriers and options for seizing this opportunity.

To date, there have been numerous obstacles in the way of effective commonage management. These include:

- ❖ Two types of commonage, subject to two different spheres of government (National Department of Land Affairs [DLA] and Local Municipalities) of which only DLA has a remotely meaningful commonage policy.
- ❖ Difficult negotiations and conflicting agendas between the National Department of Land Affairs and local government institutions that own commonage.
- ❖ Racial, socio-economic and technical rifts between incumbent and aspirant commonage users
- ❖ A lack of management capacity at the local level
- ❖ The perception that communal grazing causes land degradation.

The obstacles have contributed to the opportunistic and piece-meal management of commonage – a process that in many instances has seen commonage becoming available to local elites and not being deployed for the public good.

Fieldwork undertaken as part of this study involved visiting and interviewing stakeholders at the municipalities of Siyathemba, Kareeberg and Emthanjeni in the Karoo district. None of the relevant Integrated Development Plans (IDPs) (where these had been developed) provided meaningful guidelines for commonage management. Whilst in some instances commonage was a net source of revenue to the municipality, in almost all of the municipalities visited commonage was not fulfilling either its land reform or Local Economic Development (LED) potential. Similarly, in almost all municipalities, commonage was a source of problems and frustration for officials. If the gap between potential and reality is to be narrowed, more innovative management and greater levels of investment are necessary.

Interviews were also conducted with DLA, the Department of Agriculture (DoA), the Northern Cape Department for Local Government and Housing (DLGH), and Farm Africa (an NGO). Their policies and strategies are set out below, as well as the status quo situation of the commonage in the three case studies.

Whilst many of the characteristics of commonage described are generic, any application of the findings and recommendations should be cognisant of the environmental and institutional differences between municipalities.

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<sup>1</sup> Forthcoming research by Prof R Fox, Department of Geography, Rhodes University estimates that only 2% of South Africa is arable and available for redistribution.

## Commonage policy: Two types of commonage

The municipalities in the Bo-Karoo district own large tracts of commonage, which could make an important contribution to the land redistribution programme and to Local Government's new drive to be "developmental" (MSA 2000).

There are two kinds of commonage in question in the Bo-Karoo:

**DLA-acquired (Act 126) commonage** refers to land purchased post-1994 with public funds, which has been transferred in ownership to a municipality subject to a set of conditions. The conditions include:

- ❖ The municipality must ensure the use of the property as commonage for the benefit of the residents, with special emphasis on the poor and less privileged;
- ❖ The municipality is obliged to establish a management committee that will include representation of the user group and a member of the Department of Agriculture.
- ❖ The land may not be encumbered, alienated or transferred without the written permission of the Premier; and,
- ❖ Should the municipality fail to make the land available for land reform purposes, it could be taken over by the province.<sup>2</sup>

Significantly, the DLA sees itself primarily as the funder of the land, and does not consider itself responsible for the "aftercare" (support and mentoring of beneficiaries), which is intended to be the responsibility of Local Government.

The DLA's approach to commonage use is consistent with its drive to establish commercial farmers. It believes that the commonage land that has been bought by the DLA for the different municipalities should, ideally, function as a stepping-stone for emergent farmers intending to establish commercial agricultural enterprises.

Before land is acquired for the municipalities, their financial statements are scrutinised to see if the municipalities are able to contribute to the acquisition and maintenance of the land. In most cases municipalities are unable to contribute financially and are accordingly required to contribute in kind, with management and administration. Given the fact that there are no clear guidelines on management and administration, however, it is virtually impossible for DLA to determine whether a municipality does, in fact, have the capacity to manage the commonage.

Whilst the DLA has formulated a reasonably detailed commonage policy, much of the commonage land in the Bo-Karoo is not subject to the legislation. **Traditional municipal commonage** refers to land set aside by the state at the establishment of a town. This land was usually granted to Municipalities by the state, in the 1800s through the Crown Lands Disposal Acts.<sup>3</sup> This land is distinct from land that the municipality may have purchased (free of "public benefit" conditions of title) in that the condition of title specifies that the land be for the use and benefit of the public.

The extent of municipal commonage, or its absence, is peculiar to the historical development of each province and town. A 1996 survey of commonage established the existence of some 314 371 ha of municipal commonage within the old Northern Cape Province,<sup>4</sup> by far the majority of commonage in the province. This land is theoretically subject to the policy of provincial Departments of Local Government And Housing and the National Department of Provincial and Local Government. However neither of these departments have policy that

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<sup>2</sup> Pro forma-Notarial deed of servitude, DLA Workbook and User Guidelines, 2002.

<sup>3</sup> In a number of cases, the Dutch Reformed Church acted as town developer / establisher and the state granted land to it at the outset. In later years the DRC's role waned and land so granted (and in certain cases subject to a sale) was transferred to Municipalities.

<sup>4</sup> Anderson, M: Town Commonage in Land Reform and Local Economic Development, LAPC/SPP, 1996.

applies to municipal commonage explicitly, and as such it is largely up to Local Councils to decide how best to deploy their commonage assets within the best interests of the public.

The original thrust of the commonage policy, as described in the White Paper on South African Land Reform, 1997, was to seize the opportunity presented by existing municipal commonage for land reform purposes. The implementation of the commonage programme has failed to realise this opportunity. The DLA has no official influence or basis on which to request local governments to make existing "traditional municipal commonage" available to poor residents to bolster livelihoods<sup>5</sup>, and by its own admission has not tackled this issue. As noted, substantial land exists that could, with limited input from the DLA, provide an important land reform opportunity.

It is possible that the conception of municipal land as being outside of the realm of the DLA responsibilities is a hangover of the pre-1994 local government system in which municipalities were separate legal entities, rather than another sphere of government. Just as the DLA is actively involved in establishing policy direction, and facilitation services, in the use of state and provincial land for land reform purposes, so its role should extend to providing direction and facilitation services at the local government level. As Megan Anderson (forthcoming) points out, "Municipal commonage is state land".

Arguably, even the DLA commonage suffers from a policy framework that does not address certain key issues, and as such does not always assist local decision makers in their task of managing municipal commonage. In particular neither DLA nor Local Government commonage policy provides explicit guidelines that distinguish between the very different roles that commonage could be playing in Local Economic Development.

In the Northern Cape the Department of Local Government and Housing, along with the DLA and the Department of Agriculture have, developed a task-team, "The Committee for Cooperative Governance", to conduct an audit of commonage and its current use and to address the key policy failings.<sup>6</sup> The task-team will promote a multi-stakeholder approach in the formulation of a land use management strategy. The Land Administration Bill, which deals with provincial state land, will be linked to the commonage audit. In addition The Committee will be addressing problems such as overgrazing which results predominantly from insecure tenure, but may be affected by levels of experience. The committee will also address the development of a standardised contract for the emerging farmers across the province.

The current combination of vague policy and DLA's lack of jurisdiction (or willingness) to enforce this policy on historical commonage, has created ambiguities at the local level and places unreasonable demands on local government management and frustration by implementers and inconsistent implementation by local government employees. The policy void also allows the local deployment of the commonage to be unduly influenced by specific characters within local government, and for aspirant beneficiaries to "play themselves off" against other commonage users (see Hanover for example) in constructing arguments as to why they should not pay for commonage access. It also promotes an environment in which local and party politics and the vagaries of group dynamics exert an inappropriate influence, and constraint, on commonage deployment.

Whilst the work of the proposed "Committee" is an imperative, the real policy lacuna is at a national level, and until national policy towards all commonage is more consistent the formulation of provincial and local policies will always be complex and impose an undue burden on local officials. There is clear evidence that municipal councils within the Bo-Karoo do not welcome the additional burden of land reform or commonage management (on occasion commonage management has had to be reverted to district government). In general, local government employees articulated a negative attitude and disillusionment with regards to the commonage, and this had contributed to the ineffective deployment of the resource.

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<sup>5</sup> DLA Municipal Commonage Policy Workbook and User Guide, 2002.

<sup>6</sup> To date this committee is unfunded and as such is not yet functional

It should also be emphasised that commonage policy – even at a national level - cannot be developed in isolation. The example of Britstown is insightful in terms of the need for interdepartmental collaboration and an integrated commonage development. Both commercial and emerging farmer tenants on the commonage complained that attacks by stray dogs had inflicted stock losses and threatened the viability of stock farming. However, many people regard their dogs as a necessary security measure given the decline of the police force numbers and deteriorating crime. The example is just one of many which suggests that effective commonage management will require inputs from a wide-range of departments and stakeholders including commercial farmer unions, agricultural co-operatives, Department of Labour, Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Security networks and The Department of Social Welfare.

## **Technical Aspects of commonage agriculture in the Northern Cape**

### ***Farming practices***

The Bo-Karoo receives between 290mm - 350mm of rainfall per annum but precipitation is highly variable around this mean figure. As such the region is categorised as semi arid to arid.

The vast majority of the region is perceived to be suitable for the extensive farming of small livestock. The majority of farmers using commonage land in this area, farm with Dorper sheep and Boer goats. The average stocking rate is 5 ha per productive ewe. Commonage is also used, however, for the collection of firewood and building material, the grazing of trek-donkies, recreation and ablution.

Historically, commercial stock farmers in the region have expected their operating costs to have been covered by 20-25% of their gross farming income. If managed well, a Dorper ewe will produce an average of three lambs every two years, and the average selling price for a lamb at the target weight of 35kgs, is currently R360. This means that a farmer of Dorper sheep in the region can make an estimated gross profit of R 400 per ewe per annum.

The carrying capacity of grazing land is determined nationally according to ecological zones. In the Karoo, the prescribed stocking rate varies spatially between is 28-32 ha per large livestock unit (LLU), or 5-6 ha per small livestock unit (SLU). Exceeding the prescribed stocking rates is an offence. The National Department of Agriculture has a Natural Resource Conservation division tasked with monitoring over-grazing, and can enforce closure of grazing camps for prescribed periods so as to allow veld to recover.

Whilst the condition of semi-arid veld has shown an innate ability to recover from overgrazing after good rains, proper stocking rates are important for the conservation of the veld in the long-term. Farmers in Britstown have stated that it can take up to 10 years for overgrazed veld to recover properly and increasing dissection in the region over the past twenty years, undermines the veld recovery, and makes the prevention of overgrazing critical.

Emerging farmers, however, are less beholden to the concept of carrying capacity and its merits. There is a widely held suspicion among emerging Black pastoralists that carrying capacity is enforced as a pseudo-technical means of justifying racially based motives for keeping them away from pastures. The emerging farmers interviewed raised the point that they already have more livestock than the land that has been allocated to them is able to support. They remain reluctant to reduce their herds while the potential exists to access additional commonage currently used by commercial farmers.

There are a few hectares of arable commonage land in the Bo-Karoo that are being used for irrigated vegetable production. Whilst water remains scarce on all but a few sites situated adjacent to the Orange River, it is also difficult for emerging farmers to make the level of investment required by irrigation farming and to pay the ongoing costs of electricity (R400/month in the case of the Carnarvon Commonage Users). Alternatives to the conventional irrigation need to be explored. In Britstown, for example, the emerging farmers use a windmill, trenches and flood irrigation to irrigate vegetables they had planted.

The current rental for hiring grazing land in this region is highly variable. The De Aar municipality has offered emerging farmers a lease agreement on commonage land bought by DLA of R4,20 per productive ewe per year (although no lease agreement has been signed as yet). In Carnarvon, the emerging farmers pay R75 per ewe, per year to hire the commonage.

Some emerging farmers have cattle (see Hanover where emerging farmers keep Friesland cows and plan to run a small dairy). The natural grazing is not suitable for dairy cows, and concentrates and hay will have to be bought to feed these cows if they are to achieve good milk production. At present, this is not the case and they are producing about 5 litres of milk a day; significantly less than the average production for a Friesland cow in the rest of South Africa - which is over 20 litres per day. The Hanover emerging farmers, however, find this "low-tech" approach, with low levels of investment and returns, to be a satisfactory form of farming. Indeed, given their level of wealth, education and risk-aversion profile as well as their inability to access large milk markets, their current strategy may be totally rational. Currently the milk that the cattle provide gives them a source of protein with which to supplement the maize meal staple on which their families subsist. They are able to sell the few surplus litres a day without any investment in marketing facilities and this brings in an income of about R200 per month per cow without exposing them to undue risk.

Technical advice on good grazing practices, veld management and livestock inoculation programmes, is given to the emerging farmers by the Department of Agriculture, but the farmers themselves purchase the livestock remedies and pharmaceuticals. At present, in small towns where commonage users have no formal lease contract on commonage, incumbent farmers are unable to secure their stock at night, goats and sheep are returned every evening to the very small backyards of township residences to prevent them being stolen or attacked by dogs. The abysmal conditions, under which these stock are kept overnight undermines any other attempts to improve their condition. The animals are overcrowded, and the backyards are cold and damp and in permanent shade in some instances. Some emerging farmers inoculate and de-worm their livestock, but others do not.

For most emerging farmers, livestock pharmaceuticals are unaffordable and this prevents them from dosing and dipping properly. Much of the livestock farming on commonage provides a source of additional income for emerging farmers; stock are slaughtered opportunistically and revenue that is generated is seen as a windfall. For this reason many commonage users seem reluctant to make the level of investment on input costs that would be required if they were to make the transition from subsistence to commercial farmer.

The Bo-Karoo area that was targeted in this research, is not suited to pig farming, and most of the pigs that we observed on the commonages were malnourished and in a poor condition. Pigs require a staple of grains and cannot live on grazing. As the people who live in the townships and use the commonage to keep pigs, are generally very poor, the maize meal that is purchased is usually reserved for household consumption and pigs are fed on what slops are available. Assuming that the underlying conditions that make the region unsuitable for pigs are to be ignored and that pig-farming is going to continue in the region, the situation presents the potential for a partnership between the more affluent people living in the town who could make their scrap food and vegetable peelings available for collection by the township pig owners. Perhaps due to underlying hostilities between town dwellers and commonage users the level of logistical organisation and interaction that would make such an arrangement possible, has not been forthcoming.

Two problems common to commercial and emerging stock farmers on commonage land is livestock losses caused by theft and stray dogs, and to a lesser extent by jackals and wild cats and litter which is ingested by stock. If stray dogs are caught mauling and killing sheep, the owners have to ask the SPCA to travel from the nearest main centre, to put them down. Commercial farmers hiring commonage in Britstown, have hired the services of a private security firm, Mapogo, to reduce stock losses, at a cost to themselves of R14 000,00 per annum for grazing camps of just under 2 000ha.

## **Environmental sustainability**

Since its inception in 1997 the land reform policy has acknowledged the risk of land degradation and expressed its intention to combat soil erosion (DLA 1997 pp.26-27). To this end carrying capacity is established nationally and the country is divided into ecological zones each with a designated stocking density. Exceeding the prescribed stocking density is an offence. In September 1997 South Africa ratified the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD). The UNCCD is a legally binding agreement, requiring South Africa to prevent land degradation in arid and semi-arid regions such as the Bo-Karoo.

As a "country party" South Africa must ensure that efforts to redress desertification form, "A central and integral part of broader processes of formulating national policies for sustainable development" (UNEP 1994, article 6.1). A 1999 review, required by the UNCCD, estimates that land degradation costs South Africa R2 billion annually in lost agricultural revenue and damage to dams and irrigation systems<sup>7</sup>. The fiscal burden of land degradation is compounded by the political implications of reduced agricultural opportunity. From the outset the land reform programme has been constrained by a shortage of suitable land. The programme can ill-afford to undermine its own ends by causing degradation and further reducing the land available to aspirant farmers.

Significantly, there remain major discrepancies in opinion as to what constitutes the predominate cause of desertification, with proponents of the "disequilibrium rangeland ecology" theory maintaining that environmental and not anthropogenic factors are the problem.

Such "disequilibrium"<sup>8</sup> or "state-in-transition"<sup>9</sup> rangeland dynamics, require specific pastoral strategies. Under these conditions stocking in accordance with carrying capacity does not guarantee stable rangeland productivity. Equally the removal of grazing pressure will not necessarily result in vegetation recovery. Rather, grazing will primarily be influenced by precipitation but will also vary locally in response to soil moisture levels, grass-seed distribution, soil type and topography. In the light of this theory, the notion of a single figure for veld carrying capacity - as is applied in South Africa - is simplistic. Conservation efforts should be based on an understanding of the dynamics governing veld ecology, the manner in which grazing varies, and the innate response of the veld to environmental factors.

Significantly when these factors are considered and applied to the Bo-Karoo, the threat of reduced grazing capacity remains. This is particularly the case given increasing desiccation (both Hanover and Britstown have reported boreholes that have dried since 1999, consistent with Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change projections for the area), insecure tenure and insecure grazing rights on commonage and a lack of experience and technical skills amongst some emerging farmers.

### **Commonage management in the Bo-Karoo**

#### **Commonage users**

Within the population of current commonage users there is much diversity, but in a stylised sense commonage users can be divided into four groups:

1. "Survivalist farmers" wanting to keep a few livestock units for supplementing household food provision and for special occasions. These people are not necessarily

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<sup>7</sup> Hoffmann T; Todd, S; Ntshona, Z & Turner, S (1999) *Land Degradation in South Africa*, National Botanical Institute, South Africa.

<sup>8</sup> Behnke, R (1992) *New Directions in African Range Management Policy*. Overseas Development Institute: Pastoral Development Network, paper 32c.

<sup>9</sup> Westoby, M; Walker, B & Noy-Meir, I (1989) Opportunistic Management for Rangeland not at Equilibrium. *Journal of Range Management* 42, pp. 266-274.

interested in expanding their current number of livestock as they are sufficient for their current needs.

2. “Emerging farmers” who have acquired a few livestock and are intent on expanding their stock but who are still reliant on non-agricultural income.
3. The “proto-commercialists” who have already accumulated large numbers of stock and are in need of additional land in order to develop their own farming practice.
4. Outright commercial farmers seeking to expand their grazing without purchasing land.

Whilst there is some vertical mobility between the categories, individual’s use of the commonage is predominantly defined by the wealth, education or access to technical and political support with which they begin farming. There appears to be little evidence to support the notion that commonage provides a point of access and a means for progression up the “agricultural ladder” - from subsistence farmer to commercial farmer. In particular, there seems to be a ceiling preventing “emerging farmer” commonage users from accessing the private land market.

If the commonage is to become a means for development, upward mobility of commonage users will have to be encouraged by ensuring access training, additional resources and land acquisition and marketing opportunities. It is not expected of local government to provide these resources, but rather to “enable access to these resources many of which already exists in the private and NGO sector.

#### ***Commonage infrastructure***

Commonage remains the property of local government at all times, but responsibility for the construction, maintenance and ownership of infrastructure on commonage is variable and frequently disputed.

Commercial farmers leasing commonage are typically required to maintain the infrastructure themselves. In some instances the financial responsibility for maintenance falls to commercial farmers whilst in other instances the expenses are deducted from rental payments.

In Emthanjeni, many of the commonage users have worked on farms and accrued skills that would allow them to repair windmills, fences, water troughs and reservoirs. They say they are willing to maintain the infrastructure on the commonage they use, if they have a lease agreement with the local municipality that will secure their tenure for a reasonable period.

In Hanover, the emerging farmers complain that local government is not honouring their maintenance responsibilities on commonage land. Windmills and water troughs are not functional and as result their livestock are forced to walk long distances each day to water, causing veld degradation and stock deterioration. Certainly there was evidence of malfunctioning infrastructure on the Hanover commonage but the municipality claims that this has arisen since the emerging farmers began to use the land.

This infrastructure maintenance situation has the potential to develop into a stalemate, with municipalities stating that they will not pay for repairs and maintenance because emerging farmers do not make the lease payments, and emerging farmers saying they will not make lease payments until the municipality has repaired the infrastructure.

The obvious lack of communication between the emerging farmers and the municipalities has been exacerbated by the rationalisation of local government structures – a process that has left residents of remote towns marginalized from officials and Councillors.

Arguably, where longer and more secure leases are given to the commonage users, it might be acceptable to expect commonage users be responsible for their own infrastructure – especially given that the physical infrastructure is not expensive. If this was remedied by long-term leases, and commonage users felt secure in their commonage tenure, they might see it as in their interests to maintain the infrastructure. Certainly, obligations for infrastructure

maintenance need to be clearly described in the lease contracts governing commonage access.

In the absence of a grazing contract for the commonage it is difficult to apportion blame and responsibility for commonage maintenance. The current lack of clear contractual stipulations is part of the poor commonage management and contributes to frustrations and apathy in rental payment or in upholding commonage legislation.

It is also the case, however, that even when a Municipality has budgeted for infrastructure repairs, it is often reluctant to spend its limited cash resources on such repairs. In Emthanjeni, for example, the budget for commonage maintenance and repairs is R 14,000 for (2002-3), while the projected income from commonage lease is over R 300,000. The Treasurer in Emthanjeni claims that once emerging farmers move onto the land, they will need a budget of about R 130,000 over a five-year period to establish and maintain infrastructure. The same municipality has spent a very small portion of the R 14,000 (an inadequate amount) budgeted for commonage infrastructure in the current year, suggesting that the maintenance of commonage infrastructure is not a particularly high priority and that even if the budget for maintenance were to be increased in line with the stated estimate, it might not be spent.

### ***Institutional role players I***

A number of official and peri-official role players have a say in how commonage is deployed at the local level.

#### *(a) Emerging farmers' unions*

In the three case studies that were conducted, several similarities emerged amongst the emerging farmers unions.

All of them lacked legal status and their organisations are loosely formed. Most of them have constitutions although these are highly variable in quality. With the exception of Kareeberg, the commonage user groups lack the financial and managerial skills necessary to administer their organisation efficiently and to enforce their constitutions. In all cases, except Carnarvon, the chairpersons seemed to use their position to promote personal interests.

Although some of the groups contain female representatives (and the incumbent chair of the Britstown Emerging Farmers Association is a woman) the majority of the commonage user groups consist of men, the elderly and either Coloured or Xhosa members but very seldom both. (In Britstown, the Coloured group split from the Xhosa emerging farmers). The gender discrepancies were largely a function of the fact that stock and cattle farming is still predominantly deemed to be a "male" activity and that pastoralism is considered the best use of the agricultural land in the region.

De Aar provided an acute example of the fact that not all agricultural interest groups are represented in these supposedly representative commonage user groups. In De Aar there were clear tensions between a predominantly female group of aspirant poultry and vegetable farmers and the current commonage users – the De Aar Emerging Farmers Union – that consists of male pastoralists. There are thus several splinter groups and factions with their own interests.

Both emerging farmer and commercial white farmer commonage users complained that they have little interaction with the municipalities and that the municipality did not honour its contractual obligations to maintaining the commonage infrastructure – although it was not always clear as to exactly how the municipality had failed its obligation, since valid contracts were not always in place.

#### *(b) Agricultural Extension Officers*

The function of Agricultural Extension Officers is to provide technical skills to the municipality and their constituents so as to enable them to pursue their agricultural goals, including post-transfer support to beneficiaries of the government's land reform programme.

To this end, the officers provide the municipalities with guidance on commonage management such as grazing capacity, erosion etc. The stated intention is for the municipality to take over the land management function and to run its own commonage effectively, but there is acknowledgement that the municipalities are unlikely to become independent of the extension officers. The constituencies covered by the extension officers are large and the distances that they are required to travel excessive, which makes it difficult for them to provide the level of support to all constituents that is required if progress is to be affected. The extension officers are also providing training to emerging farmers in terms of technical, financial and management skills in order to develop a business sense, how to reinvest in the land and think commercially.

In the Karoo, there are 7 extension officers and one district manager. One of the problems that has been identified is that the geographical boundaries within which the extension officers operate do not comply with the boundaries of the newly amalgamated municipalities. This means that two different extension officers may oversee towns in the same municipality. The Department of Agriculture (DoA) claims that they are aware of this discrepancy and will be considering a revision. There is also a lack of staff on the ground, which makes efficient coverage of all the areas difficult. The ideal situation would be to have one extension officer per local municipality.

(c) *Organised agriculture - and the potential for partnerships*

Research by the LOGOSUL team identified potential for mutually beneficial collaboration between emerging farmers and existing white farmers in the activities of, stock theft, knowledge sharing, co-operative marketing (which would allow reciprocal access to formal markets for emerging farmers, dog and litter management and to informal markets for white commercial farmers), dosing and rural security for example. Realisation of this potential could be facilitated by the development of communication between existing and emerging farmer networks.

Where both parties stand to gain, there is vast scope for collaborative ventures:

**Table 1: Potential incentives for collaboration in farming enterprises**

<b>Emerging farmers gain</b>	<b>Commercial farmers gain</b>
Access to technical experience	Access to land, credit and water at subsidised rates reserved for emerging agriculture
Access to input and output markets	Contribution to land security and political goodwill
Economies of scale	Stable rural environment, stake in the land redistribution discourse
Additional investment in rural development	Stock security
	Incentivised labour
	Potential mentors payment
	Entry into a rapidly growing black consumer market
	Access to indigenous knowledge

Without exception, the commercial farmers with whom we spoke, committed themselves to supporting the process of land reform, and stated that the commonages were the best place to nurture emerging farmers. The Noord-Kaap Landbou-Unie, stated publicly that they support land reform and encouraged their member associations to become involved at the local level. The joint ventures in question have also received verbal support from almost all government departments.

The question then arises as to why more joint ventures have not been forthcoming. Some of the barriers to this collaboration include:

1. The lack of mediation between the stakeholders: the commercial farmers and the emerging farmers had failed to express their (alleged) willingness to help one another to each other. This can partly be attributed to a fear of change, and the history of mistrust between racial groups. However, it may also reveal that stakeholders are far more enthusiastic about collaboration when in an interview situation than in reality.
2. The emerging farmer groups are not always sufficiently organised to facilitate easy interaction, and there is reluctance on the behalf of commercial farmers to engage a large and disorganised group.
3. Markedly different farming styles and different technologies, different propensity to take on risk, and discrepancies in the ability to invest in fixed improvements.

The current discrepancies and asymmetries in experience and investment capital, create the risk of fostering paternalism and a replication of the distribution of power and benefits that were structurally enforced under apartheid within partnerships. In order for this not to be the case, partnerships will have to be mediated by a third party capable of reconciling the socio-economic and cultural asymmetries between aspirant partners. The local municipality is well positioned to play this role, but does not currently have the staff nor the capacity to facilitate this at present.

A technical constraint on collaboration exists on DLA commonage, because it is reserved for households earning less than R 2,200 a month (this constraint was experienced in Kareeberg for example). This policy prescription should be reviewed in specific examples where collaboration could provide skills that other agencies (including government) are unable to provide, and where there is potential benefit for emerging farmers.

In Prieska, irrigation land has been made available at the Oranjesig farm. The emerging farmers, however, do not have the capacity or the skills for irrigation farming. The municipality along with Mr du Toit, the agricultural extension officer, wants to rent the land out to a white commercial farmer, who specialises in irrigation farming. Initially the commercial farmer will rent 80% of the land and the emerging farmers will use 20%. He will provide training and support and the municipality will provide the materials to the emerging farmers. Over time, the commercial farmer will withdraw and the emerging farmers will gain access to progressively more land.

#### *FARM (Food and Agriculture Research Management) Africa*

Food and Agriculture Research Management Africa (FARMAfrica) is an United Kingdom-based NGO which focuses on agricultural development and 'sustainable natural resource management'<sup>10</sup>. The organisation operates mainly in East African countries but has had branches in the Eastern and Northern Cape since 1995, supporting the land redistribution programme,

FARMAfrica currently supports 5 projects in the Northern Cape of which three involve commonage. The organisation's focus is on 'land reform projects in the post transfer stage of development', which includes land restitution and land redistribution. Their aim is the empowerment of land reform communities and the creation of capacity for the management of natural resources and development agendas. The organisation offers support in terms of

- 'Capacity Building of Trust/Communal Property Associations and sub-structures of such legal entities
- Financial and Administrative Training
- Training in Technical Agricultural activities
- Other Technical Training
- Development facilitation support
- Legal Support

<sup>10</sup>

Information taken from the FARM Africa information leaflet

- Micro financing for income generating projects
- Research
- Management of revolving funds.<sup>11</sup>

The organisation works in close collaboration with the Commission on the Restitution of Land Rights, DLA and DoA. The organisation's main offices are located in Kimberly. FARMAfrica have eight staff in the region, and is fully funded by DIFD and the EU.

Current projects include land restitution claims concerning the #Khomani San, the Dirisanang- and the Witbank communities, and land redistribution claims which include the Strydenburg, Pofadder and Siyathemba commonage.

FARMAfrica's focus could be particularly useful as a counter balance to the commercial focus of the DLA, which given the capital and skill deficits in the Karoo region, is likely to exclude large cohorts of the population and expose them to destitution.

(b) *The Surplus People's Project (SPP)*

The SPP are active in the Northern Cape, and although not interviewed by the research team, there was evidence of their assistance with the development of communal resource institutions. Given the institutional deficit in the region, their contribution is extremely valuable.

***Municipal revenue from the commonage***

The commonage is an important source of revenue for the municipality (see figures and tables below). One of the reasons posited by municipalities for not giving emerging black farmers more access to the commonage is a reluctance to forego the revenue generated by the commonage when it is leased to commercial white farmers.

**Table \*: Relative income from commonage and property tax in different towns in Emthanjeni and Kareeberg**

	<b>Income from commonage 2001/2002</b>	<b>Income from property tax</b>
<b>Emthanjeni</b>		
Hanover	R 126 700	R 159 000
Britstown	R 111 340	R 247 000
De Aar	R 13 000	R 573 202
<b>Kareeberg (all towns)</b>		
	R 230 000	R 55 000

In Emthanjeni, approximately 15% of the municipality's budgeted income comes from the commonage. This figure is inflated however by the culture of non-payment by the urban constituents and in practice is often in the order of 40-50%. This revenue is derived primarily from white commercial farmers at this stage.

The income from the commonage in Kareeberg in the 2001/2002 financial year is R 230 000 plus R 55 000 in property tax - R 285 000, which constitutes 3.7 % of the total municipal budget.

The claim that commonage has to be used for municipal income generation and that this necessitates rental to white commercial farmers is, however, flawed on a number of accounts.

- 1) It assumes that emerging farmers will not pay anything for access to the commonage even though there are examples (see Carnarvon) showing that where contractual

<sup>11</sup> Information taken from the FARM Africa information leaflet

- obligation and conditions of rental are clearly stipulated, emerging farmers are able to make significant contributions to municipal revenue.
- 2) The argument fails to acknowledge the costs of not using the commonage for emerging farmers (animals in the residential areas and associated health problems and costs, the cost of foregone income generated by the poorer population cohorts had they been able to access an additional form of enterprise, cost of malnutrition and lost productivity, in the poorer community members)
  - 3) The argument fails to acknowledge the potential cost of unsatisfied land hunger.
  - 4) The municipality's dependency on commonage revenue is not consistent with national land policy, fiscal management policy (although policy on both fronts could be more specific) or the responsibilities outlined for Local Government in the Municipal Systems Act (2000). Certainly the cross-subsidisation of urban services (caused in part by poor fiscal management, bad payment culture and tax collection in the towns) by rural rental of commonage is contradictory to the rural development focus of the IDPs. Municipalities should be able to draw down funds for service provision from other national sources (particularly the equitable share) if they were able to show that they were deploying commonage in a manner consistent with land redistribution programme and that this was the cause of fiscal deficits.
  - 5) Relative to the total municipal revenue (R 7.7 million for Kareeberg for example), the amounts received from commonage are small (3% in the case of Kareeberg).

Admittedly many of the "savings" or "revenue generation" activities mentioned above are indirect, whilst the collection of rents from the commonage provides a direct and often urgently-needed source of income. But the government's quest for integrated development encourages acknowledgement of direct and indirect costs and benefits. Equally there have been requests from the President, the Minister of Agriculture, and top officials in (white) Organised Agriculture to pursue land redistribution at a more urgent pace suggesting that this should be prioritised above the relatively small rents that would be foregone by renting commonage to emerging farmers as opposed to commercial farmers.

### Options for commonage access

There are tensions in the potential use of commonage land that policy at a national level needs to address. In particular there is a need - even in the DLA commonage policy which is reasonably detailed - to provide clearer guidelines as to the role that commonage should be playing with regards to:

- **A social security net:** in which case access should be as wide spread as possible. The commonage would have diverse functions such as graveyards, provision of firewood, sanitation, grazing for draught animals and waste disposal (see below).
- **A stepping stone** for the furthering of land reform, i.e. an intermediate option between aspirant farmers and commercial farming with private tenure. This might be particularly appropriate given the inability of the stagnant land market to satisfy the demand for land market based redistribution, and in the context of the Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD) programme which rewards applicants that have a track-record and an accumulation of farming assets (see below).
- Commonage as part of the **economic development/commercial farmer** mandate in which case there is a need for robust institutions, business plans, firm commitments and accountable activities.

There are profound differences in the implications that are required to ensure these approaches, and in many instances, the outcomes are not compatible. It is not possible, for example, to promote the economic development mandate without restricting access to other aspirant users, their dogs, stock and cattle - and thereby undermining the social security safety net function of commonage. It is also unreasonable to expect local official to have to make difficult trade-offs between conflicting mandates. The difficulty in adhering to social security and economic development mandates within environmental constraints has, in

conjunction with inadequate policy guidelines, contributed to apathy and inconsistent action on behalf of municipal officials when it comes to deploying the commonage. This situation has been exacerbated by weak civic institutions, the rationalisation of local government boundaries and functions and the general lack of capacity within local government.

The inescapable reality is that, without expropriating white farmers, private land in the Bo-Karoo is insufficient to satisfy existing land hunger without causing desertification. A fundamental issue arising out of the failure of policy to advocate a clear role for commonage, is the matter of who qualifies for commonage access. DLA policy posits that households earning less than R 2,200 p.m. should be given preference in commonage access, but this criteria is often difficult to establish and apply (as is the definition of a household). In addition the income cap does not apply to Traditional Commonage. Arguably, only once these higher policy frameworks have been established, can local government<sup>12</sup> and local institutions align their own frameworks for decision making so as to ensure appropriate and consistent decision making.

(a) *A social security net – the commons approach*

To attenuate tensions contained in mounting land hunger and limited land resources, commonage in the Bo-Karoo will have to be used to create pastoral opportunities for as many emerging farmers as is possible. One of the means by which this might best be achieved is through communal - but restricted - access to the commonage. The distinction between communal land access and unrestricted land access relies in the formulation of common resource institutions, that define and enforce terms on which grazing can be accessed.

A major focus for local government should then be the creation of these communal grazing institutions. The rules governing these institutions need to be consistent with national policy. For this to be possible, DLA and DLGH need to be more explicit in laying down guidelines for commonage use (for example appropriate lease periods, sanction for overgrazing, preferred racial, gender and income profile of commonage users and the extent to which partnerships with white farmers should be encouraged). Within these guidelines commonage user groups should be encouraged to formulate their own rules within a facilitated environment.

Even where the existing commonage is accessed communally, access will have to be restricted in some way if land degradation is to be prevented. There is no evidence that local government authorities have the capacity or resources to police the commonage on behalf of users. It is therefore proposed that commonage users themselves are charged with this responsibility.

For any restriction to be credible, the option of accessing available grazing would have to be distributed as broadly as possible *ex ante* (perhaps as a servitude attached to a title deed<sup>13</sup>, or as a “tax-payers right”). Where this is the case grazing rights could be traded so as that aspirant and more proficient pastoralists are able to purchase additional grazing in proportion with their desires and ability. Provided grazing rights were distributed equitably in the beginning and trading was conducted in an open forum, no aspirant commonage user would be restricted unless they had traded their grazing right in exchange for compensation (in kind or cash). Vesting the rights to grazing with the broader public is, in fact, the only credible means of ensuring widespread subscription to grazing regulations and particularly restrictions.

A broad based communal tenure system would also prohibit the commonage being appropriated by a “local elite” at the expense of the broader, poorer, community many of whom rely on commonage for a range of functions including grazing, firewood collection, ablution, building material and recreation. Commonage users would have to subscribe to the regulations that govern a particular piece of grazing. It would be important that the regulations governing the group’s grazing and other activities were clearly defined, enforceable, and reflect the environmental constraints of the region. Ideally, but not necessarily, stock owners

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<sup>12</sup> In the form of Integrated Development Plans (IDPs).

<sup>13</sup> This would be akin to specific erven in small towns which have “fountain-water rights”, i.e. the right to use a communal fountain, according to a set weekly time-table or schedule.

would use the commonage to build up a small herd, which could then be used to leverage LRAD funding, cash flows or additional finance and purchase land privately.

(b) *A stepping stone approach*

One of the common perceptions with regards to commonage use, is that the land should be used by small groups of aspirant emerging farmers to gain experience and some asset which could be used at a later stage to access an LRAD grant and private land (this view was for example mentioned by DLA Kimberley, The Carnarvon Commercial Farmers Union, and councillors in De Aar).

Where this strategy is pursued, it should be done with cognisance of the potential pitfalls. It will disadvantage those members of the community for whom the commonage is a form of social security net. As such it is not a pro-poor strategy and deviates from the traditional function filled (internationally) by common property resources, namely a final resource separating the poorest of the poor from the destitute. Such a policy is however consistent with the LRAD programme and could prove valuable in allowing potential beneficiaries to accumulate “kind” and leverage additional LRAD funds.

Given the problem of selecting beneficiaries in this approach, it becomes even more important that common property institutions prohibit the appropriation of commonage and commonage user groups by relatively affluent “local cronies”. Once again this can only be achieved where robust and inclusive (particularly gender inclusive) institutions govern commonage access – and these would have to be formulated. The case of De Aar for example captures the difficulty of ensuring a merit-based representivity at the local level. By achieving a critical mass and recognition by the municipality, the DAEMFU appear to have marginalized other aspirant farmers and particularly women. The exclusion of some aspirant farmers is inevitable given the land scarcity. However, what is unacceptable about the DAEMFU group, is the fact that they do not have systematic criteria for ensuring that their group upholds any notion of the public good.

The minimum lease for commonage should be 5 years, and over this period, the emerging farmer should have increased his/her stock and should move off the commonage by having acquired his/her own land (possibly with the aid of LRAD), thus making place for other emerging farmers.

### **13. Implication for local government**

One of the key challenges if commonage is to fulfil its potential, will be generating enough political interests in the commonage. All efforts to raise attention as to the potential that is presented in commonage, needs to be cognisant of the fact that the current Government’s electorate is predominantly urban and that the quest to establish Black agriculturalists currently focuses on capital intensive commercial farming, which is unlikely to be possible on commonage. As such the potential presented by commonage is not high on the political agenda, and securing the required level of support and investment for commonage will remain difficult, regardless of the potential that is presented.

A possible strategy in overcoming this situation might involve pointing out to the DLA the potential that effective management of commonage presents for redressing the tardy pace of land reform. Were the DLA to oversee all commonage and assist local government in creating sustainable agricultural opportunities it would - relatively easily - be able to claim credit for the “transfer” of large tracts of land and the empowerment of many aspirant farmers.

### Distinction Between Communal Grazing and Unrestricted Access

A prevailing problem in the region involves the insufficient availability of land to support the population of the towns – given that an economic unit is between 1, 000 ha and 5, 000 ha per household.

A possible solution to this problem is found in the notion of a communal grazing governed by a common property association or community trusts. The notion of communal enterprise is familiar to many African agriculturalists and has been used successfully elsewhere in Africa (see the Turkana pastoralists for example, and reviews of Kenyan agriculture by Mary Tiffen). It is possible that communal grazing institutions would allow a combination of land access to relatively large numbers of currently landless aspirant farmers, a means of accruing some stock enabling the leverage of LRAD funds, and the provision of a small income flow to currently impoverished residents. In western analyses, communal property arrangements have however often been implicated in environmental destruction – most notably in Hardin's gloomy 1971 prognosis, "The Tragedy of the Commons". In Hardin's view, the desire to utilise the available grazing before fellow commonage users results in a race to the bottom, and in overgrazing, and ultimately in the creation of disincentives for economic growth.

This view of communal farming is true of agriculture in South Africa, where the predominant white commercial farm has, historically, been predicated on private tenure. However, given robust institutions, communal farming may be more appropriate than private farming under certain conditions. Almost all existing and aspirant black commonage users have alternative sources of household income. For the majority of beneficiaries, communal grazing rights should seek to complement existing income streams with the expectation that a few commonage users will continue to access LRAD funding and become economically self-sufficient farmers.

The legitimisation of communal tenure would be management intensive and would require new approaches to be adopted by the Department of Agriculture, DLA and local government. Many of these approaches are however consistent with current international trends, as Cousins (2002) points out:

"Major shifts in understandings of property rights are now taking place within Western societies. Environmental law, in particular, increasingly places owners of property under a variety of obligations to society at large, as our shared interests in the commons begins to be acknowledged. Notions of exclusive and absolute ownership are giving way to ideas about shared and relative rights, socially regulated through institutions of democratic governance. Community-based systems and locally held records, rather than titling, need not be seen as second-rate – but the state needs to provide these with appropriate legal recognition and dedicated institutional support." Cousins, B (2002) *Critical comments on the communal land rights Bill*.

Institutions need constitutions, behavioural rules, and codes of conduct. The facilitation of common property institutions should encourage communities to devise specific clauses governing their behaviour with regards to the following:

- A guiding mandate(s) that can be upheld and referred to in decision making or in trade-off analysis (e.g. the groups welfare, or individual profit, maintenance of the grazing resource).
- Specific rules for the relative rights of individuals i.e. is there a cap on the number of stock that a person can keep relative to the other members, how are stock increases negotiated, does the group favour egalitarianism or acknowledge a competitive environment in which some members may get ahead with herd enlargements at the expense of others.
- Rules of entry and exit – who may be a member, what entry requirements are made (experience, residence, payment) how may a person exit the group and what claims to assets are appropriate on exit.

- Means by which grazing rights might be exchanged between members.
- Bequest – for the sake of institutional continuity groups should specify rules governing the control of rights and assets of death of a member. Where agreeable members should be allowed to bequeath grazing rights (subject to approval of new entrant by incumbent members perhaps) and be encouraged to draw up wills.
- Meeting and election procedures should be specified clearly and all members should be allowed to challenge and redress inappropriate behaviour by means of a special general meeting for example. The ability of marginalized members to be able to call elected authorities to account is important to prevent appropriation of commonage by self-interested parties.
- Rules for sanction of members that transgress groups regulations or grazing capacity.

The formation of robust common property institutions is easier where cultural and socio-economic homogeneity exists (see Carnarvon's CEFU for example where the group is exclusively coloured and does not have members that are among the poorest of the poor). The example of CEFU is insightful as to appropriate rules for the formulation of a common property institution. The group has a clear commercial mandate to which members are required to prescribe. The association's commercial focus is demonstrated by the fact that they slaughter at right time of year in terms of the animal development. In contrast, stock owners in other towns slaughter opportunistically or at Christmas or weddings and often receive sub-optimal prices for their stock. The need to be flexible in the timing of the slaughter of animals but to slaughter at right time of year in terms of animal progress could be reconciled by the "unitisation of the herd" i.e. each person owns a percentage of the communal herd. Each member can trade in some of his/her herd share when he/she needs the cash, but animals are slaughtered at specific times of year. In this sense, the herd becomes like a bank allowing you access to cash whenever you need it but does not compromise the best pastoral strategy. This approach would require the association to have some cash saved up – or an overdraft facility. In order to prevent a "run on the herd " (with everyone cashing in for fear that they wont be able to in the future the system would require a limit on the amount that you could cash in any one year – just like a banking limit.

The group is institutionally robust and management and development has been forthcoming. The ability to exclude aspirant farmers from the group on the grounds that they are unable to comply with the membership criteria is an important part of this institutional strength.

There is a real danger, however, in allowing the commonage user groups in this region to become too elitist for sake of administrative expedience or sanitised institutions especially in this region where so many people are extremely poor. National policy and the guidelines established by the commonage committee need to establish guidelines to ensure that the overwhelming need to address social welfare and survival in this province is not neglected in the desire to establish emerging and commercial farmers via the commonage. Certainly if commonage is not to be used as a poverty safety-net alternative measures (public work schemes for example) will have to be put in place.

This would go some way to relieving the current pressure on the DLA that has arisen as a result of poor land reform statistics to date.

Even if the necessary political will were to be generated at a national level with commensurate investment from national coffers, the new demands that the implementation of a national commonage policy would make on local government should not be underestimated.

Such change would have to be initiated and intensively managed. It has been suggested that municipalities procure the services of a Municipal Development Officer in an attempt to implement their IDPs, co-ordinate the activities and resources of line departments and facilitate collaboration with the private sector. The appointed person could be part of a fourth line department alongside administrative, financial and technical department.

Alternatively, a person in charge of commonage development could be part of a national competency but seconded to local government. For example Agricultural Extension Officers could be given broader powers, additional training in community facilitation and entrusted with the process.

The envisaged Development Officer should oversee the implementation of IDP projects and promote the institutional change that will be required within municipalities if they are to be embrace and be supportive of the spirit of the IDPs. Pursuit of these goals with regards to commonage would require:

- ❖ Manage the reduction of revenue from commonage rental (if this is indeed the case)
- ❖ Interpret existing government policy at the local level. Where necessary develop local commonage policy in the IDPs so as to be consistent with provincial and national commonage policy.
- ❖ Develop better understanding of grazing ecology and formulate new approaches to the prevention of desertification.
- ❖ Create an enabling environment for effective commonage through the effective dissemination of policy and market information.
- ❖ Help create robust common property institutions, and oversee the management of these institutions.
- ❖ Forge equitable partnerships between commercial and emerging partnerships
- ❖ Integrate commonage development with other local government development projects.
- ❖ Procure the skills from line departments and non-government service providers.

Within the larger municipalities, there are currently experts who deal with issues envisaged for the proposed development officer. In the smaller municipalities, however, employees are expected to see to development programmes alongside their routine duties, even where they do not possess the required skills to do so. The assumption that all municipal employees have the skills and experience to address complex development issues (many involving technical inputs such as soil science, ecology, legal certification and animal husbandry) is questionable. Organisations such as FARM Africa (who were supportive of the notion of a development officer) would be a valuable resource in terms of providing the necessary training for commonage related issues.

The efficacy of a development officer would, be contingent upon a consistent policy toward commonage. The current situation in which there is no consistent development policy applied to the commonage across towns. There is no consistent development approach or development culture applied to the commonage across towns, promote opportunism and would greatly undermine the work of anybody trying to foster development at the local level. The formation of commonage committees on which different Departments would go a long way to creation of the necessary policy.

#### **14. Performance indicators**

A major constraint in this review has been the absence of any detailed information and figures with regard to the programme. A concern about this lack of information is that policy direction and the programme as a whole has been evaluated without any quantifiable, detailed information over time. Land reform is demonstrably a transformation process that takes time.

Programmes require some years for systems to be worked through, put in place and their performance assessed. Inadequate information makes insightful policy development difficult.

More critically, this dearth of information points directly to the heart of the commonage problem – where land is transferred it is difficult to ascertain that beneficiaries have secured rights or realised benefits.

Performance measures need to be established to determine the effectiveness of the land-use and management by the commonage users as well as potential pit-falls. Performance indicators could also help in determining the progress of development of the land users and the efficiency of land use. They could provide useful information on the following and might solicit ongoing information on various management issues.

Potential performance indicators for the commonage project are:

1. *Availability and deployment of land, satisfaction of land hunger*
  - Emerging farmer / commercial farmer ratio of commonage deployment.
  - The number of users of the commonage proportion to the amount of land, and users per large/small stock unit.
  - How many new farmers have been given access to land in the past year?
2. *Is commonage meeting broader policy targets*
  - Racial composition of commonage users
  - Income generated from commonage use
  - Welfare improved from commonage use – nutrition level improving, skill levels improving, opportunities arising for the potentially destitute.
3. *Cross-sectoral interaction*
  - Extent of inter-departmental involvement in commonage management – how many stakeholders represented on the commonage committee and how frequently are meetings held - municipality, commercial and emerging farmers, agricultural unions and extension officers, SPP, IDT, Land Bank, DLA, DEAT.
4. *Commercialisation of the commonage users*
  - Number of users per annum becoming independent and acquiring their own land either through the LRAD programme or through independent initiatives.
5. *Environmental*
  - Monitoring of land degradation and top-soil erosion.
  - In cases of overgrazing: have remedial steps been taken? e.g. are the camps subjected to rotational grazing?
  - Cases where the land that previously was in a bad condition has recovered
6. *Training of emerging farmers*
  - Extent to which emerging farmers received support in terms of training from government departments, NGOs, commercial farmers.
7. *Interaction with commercial farmers*
  - Extent to which interaction is taking place with commercial farmers, eg regular meetings, share-cropping initiatives etc.
  - Extent to which commercial farmers and emerging farmers have taken the independent initiative to cooperate
  - Extent to which emerging farmers are represented on agricultural unions and given access to farmer co-operatives.
8. *Municipal interaction*
  - Payment culture: improvement or worsening.
  - Payment rates (e.g. some emerging farmers pay market rates such as in Kareeberg while others pay highly deflated rates)
  - Involvement of the municipality on the commonage in terms of projects such as set out in the IDPs; for example irrigation projects, vegetable garden projects, bakeries, tourism related projects etc.
  - Acquisition of funding from external funding organisations, financiers.
  - Extent to which legal contracts are in place, which have been drafted with community input.
  - Existence of a commonage committee, a land/grazing management plan, and other supportive and legal structures and guidelines of the municipality for land management.
  - Cost of commonage to the municipalities per user and as a percentage of total revenue (maintenance cost – estimated “foregone” income by providing access to land at subsidised rate).

9. *Emerging farmers organisation*

- Extent to which the emerging farmers unions represent all farming interests e.g. pigs, poultry, vegetables etc), gender, race and youth representation
- Are commonage user groups robust, do legal entities exist and the institutions effective, regular meetings, meeting contractual obligations?
- Are there splinter groups or are all emerging farmers combined under one umbrella group?
- Do they have functioning administrative and financial systems in place such as bank accounts, credit collection, offices, book keeping facilities?